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Abstract
We initiate the study of two-party cryptographic primitives
with unconditional security, assuming that the adversary’s
quantum memory is of bounded size. We show that oblivious
transfer and bit commitment can be implemented in this
model using protocols where honest parties need no quantum
memory, whereas an adversarial player needs quantum
memory of size at least n/2 in order to break the protocol,
where n is the number of qubits transmitted. This is
in sharp contrast to the classical bounded-memory model,
where we can only tolerate adversaries with memory of size
quadratic in honest players’ memory size. Our protocols
are efficient, non-interactive and can be implemented using
today’s technology. On the technical side, a new entropic
uncertainty relation involving min-entropy is established.
1. Introduction
It is well known that non-trivial 2-party cryptographic primi-
tives cannot be securely implemented if only error-free com-
munication is available and there is no limitation assumed
on the computing power and memory of the players. Funda-
mental examples of such primitives are bit commitment (BC)
and oblivious transfer (OT). In BC, a committer C commits
himself to a choice of a bit b by exchanging information with
a verifier V. We want that V does not learn b (we say the
commitment is hiding), yet C can later chose to reveal b in
a convincing way, i.e., only the value fixed at commitment
time will be accepted by V (we say the commitment is
binding). In (Rabin) OT, a sender S sends a bit b to a receiver
R by executing some protocol in such a way that R receives
b with probability 12 and nothing with probability
1
2 , yet S
does not learn what was received.
Informally, BC is not possible with unconditional secu-
rity since hiding means that when 0 is committed, exactly
the same information exchange could have happened when
committing to a 1. Hence, even if 0 was actually committed
∗Basic Research in Computer Science (BRICS), funded by the Danish
National Research Foundation, Dept. of Computer Science, University of
Aarhus, {ivan|salvail|chris}@brics.dk.
†FICS, Foundations in Cryptography and Security, funded by the Danish
Natural Sciences Research Council.
‡CWI, Amsterdam, Netherlands, fehr@cwi.nl
§Supported in part by the European project PROSECCO.
¶Supported by the European project SECOQC.
to, C could always compute a complete view of the protocol
consistent with having committed to 1, and pretend that
this was what he had in mind originally. A similar type of
argument shows that OT is also impossible in this setting.
One might hope that allowing the protocol to make use
of quantum communication would make a difference. Here,
information is stored in qubits, i.e., in the state of two-level
quantum mechanical systems, such as the polarization state
of a single photon. It is well known that quantum informa-
tion behaves in a way that is fundamentally different from
classical information, enabling, for instance, unconditionally
secure key exchange between two honest players. However,
in the case of two mutually distrusting parties, we are not so
fortunate: even with quantum communication, uncondition-
ally secure BC and OT remain impossible [14, 16].
There are, however, several scenarios where these impos-
sibility results do not apply, namely:
• if the computing power of players is bounded,
• if the communication is noisy,
• if the adversary is under some physical limitation, e.g.,
the size of the available memory is bounded.
The first scenario is the basis of many well known solu-
tions based on plausible but unproven complexity assump-
tions, such as hardness of factoring or discrete logarithms.
The second scenario has been used to construct both BC
and OT protocols in various models for the noise [4, 5, 8].
The third scenario is our focus here. In this model, OT and
BC can be done using classical communication assuming,
however, quite restrictive bounds on the adversary’s memory
size [2, 9], namely it can be at most quadratic in the memory
size of honest players. Such an assumption is on the edge of
being realistic, it would clearly be more satisfactory to have a
larger separation between the memory size of honest players
and that of the adversary. However, this was shown to be
impossible [12].
In this paper, we study for the first time what happens if in-
stead we consider protocols where quantum communication
is used and we place a bound on the adversary’s quantum
memory size. There are two reasons why this may be a good
idea: first, if we do not bound the classical memory size,
we avoid the impossibility result of [12]. Second, the adver-
sary’s goal typically is to obtain a certain piece of classical
information, however, converting quantum information to
classical by measuring may irreversibly destroy information,
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and we may be able to arrange it such that the adversary
cannot afford to loose information this way, while honest
players can.
It turns out that this is indeed possible: we present proto-
cols for both BC and OT in which n qubits are transmitted,
where honest players need no quantum memory, but where
the adversary must store at least n/2 qubits to break the
protocol. We emphasize that no bounds are assumed on the
adversary’s computing power, nor on his classical memory.
This is clearly much more promising than the classical case,
not only from a theoretical point of view, but also in practice:
while sending qubits and measuring them immediately as
they arrive is well within reach of current technology, storing
even a single qubit for more than fraction of a second is a
formidable technological challenge. Furthermore, we show
that our protocols also work in a non-ideal setting where we
allow the quantum source to be imperfect and the quantum
communication to be noisy.
Our protocols are non-interactive, only one party sends
information when doing OT, commitment or opening. Fur-
thermore, the commitment protocol has the interesting prop-
erty that the only message is sent to the committer, i.e.,
it is possible to commit while only receiving information.
Such a scheme clearly does not exist without a bound on the
committer’s memory, even under computational assumptions
and using quantum communication: a corrupt committer
could always store (possibly quantumly) all the information
sent, until opening time, and only then follow the honest
committer’s algorithm to figure out what should be sent
to convincingly open a 0 or a 1. Note that in the classi-
cal bounded-storage model, it is known how to do time-
stamping that is non-interactive in our sense: a player can
time-stamp a document while only receiving information
[17]. However, no reasonable BC or protocol that time-
stamps a bit exist in this model. It is straightforward to see
that any such protocol can be broken by an adversary with
classical memory of size twice that of an honest player, while
our protocol requires no memory for the honest players and
remains secure against any adversary not able to store more
than half the size of the quantum transmission.
We also note that it has been shown earlier that BC is pos-
sible using quantum communication, assuming a different
type of physical limitation, namely a bound on the size of
coherent measurement that can be implemented [19]. This
limitation is incomparable to ours: it does not limit the total
size of the memory, instead it limits the number of bits that
can be simultaneously operated on to produce a classical
result. Our adversary has a limit on the total memory size,
but can measure all of it coherently. The protocol from
[19] is interactive, and requires a bound on the maximal
measurement size that is sublinear in n.
On the technical side, we use the quantum privacy am-
plification result by Renner and Ko¨nig [18] together with a
proof technique by Shor and Preskill [20] where we purify
the actions of honest players. This makes no difference from
the adversary’s point of view, but makes proofs go through
more easily. We combine this with a new technical result that
may be seen as a new type of uncertainty relation involving
min-entropy (Theorem 3.7).
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation
For a set I = {i1, i2, . . . , i} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and a n-bit
string x ∈ {0, 1}n, we define x|I : = xi1xi2 · · ·xi . For
x ∈ {0, 1}n, we write Bδn(x) for the set of all n-bit
strings at Hamming distance at most δn from x. Note that
the number of elements in Bδn(x) is the same for all x,
we denote it by Bδn : = |Bδn(x)|. For x, y ∈ {0, 1}n,
x · y ∈ {0, 1} denotes the (standard) in-product of x and y.
For a probability distribution Q over n-bit strings and a set
L ⊆ {0, 1}n, we abbreviate the (overall) probability of L
with Q(L) :=
∑
x∈L Q(x). All logarithms in this paper are
to base two. We denote by h(p) the binary entropy function
h(p) : = −(p · log p + (1 − p) · log (1− p)). We denote
by negl(n) any function of n smaller than any polynomial
provided n is sufficiently large.
The pair {|0〉, |1〉} denotes the computational or rectilin-
ear or “+” basis for the 2-dimensional complex Hilbert space
C
2
. The diagonal or “×” basis is defined as {|0〉×, |1〉×}
where |0〉× = 1√2 (|0〉 + |1〉) and |1〉× = 1√2 (|0〉 − |1〉).
Measuring a qubit in the + -basis (resp. ×-basis) means
applying the measurement described by projectors |0〉〈0| and
|1〉〈1| (resp. projectors |0〉×〈0|× and |1〉×〈1|×). When the
context requires it, we write |0〉+ and |1〉+ instead of |0〉
respectively |1〉; and for any x ∈ {0, 1}n and r ∈ {+,×},
we write |x〉r =
⊗n
i=1 |xi〉r. If we want to choose the + or
×-basis according to the bit b ∈ {0, 1}, we write {+,×}[b].
2.2. Quantum probability theory
As basis for the security definitions and proofs of our
protocols, we are using the formalism introduced in [18],
which we briefly summarize here. A random state ρ is
a random variable, with distribution Pρ, whose range is
the set of density operators of a fixed Hilbert space. The
view of an observer (which is ignorant of the value of ρ)
is given by the quantum system described by the density
operator [ρ] :=
∑
ρ Pρ(ρ)ρ. In general, for any event E , we
define [ρ|E ] := ∑ρ Pρ|E(ρ)ρ. If ρ is dependent on some
classical random variable X , with joint distribution PXρ,
we also write ρx instead of [ρ|X = x]. Note that ρx is
a density operator (for any fixed x) whereas ρX is again a
random state. The overall quantum system is then given by
[{X} ⊗ ρ] = ∑x PX(x) {x} ⊗ ρx, where {x} := |x〉〈x|
is the state representation of x and {X} the corresponding
random state. Obviously, [{X} ⊗ ρ] = [{X}] ⊗ [ρ] if and
only if ρX is independent of X , where the latter in particular
2
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implies that no information on X can be learned by observ-
ing only ρ. Furthermore, if [{X}⊗ρ] and [{X}]⊗ [ρ] are ε-
close in terms of their trace distance δ(ρ, σ) = 12 tr(|ρ−σ|),
then the real system [{X}⊗ρ] “behaves” as the ideal system
[{X}] ⊗ [ρ] except with probability ε [18] in that for any
evolution of the system no observer can distinguish the real
from the ideal one with advantage greater than ε/2. By slight
abuse of notation, we usually simply write X instead of
{X}. Henceforth, we use UNIF to denote a random variable
with range {0, 1}, uniformly distributed and independent of
anything else.
When reviewing the privacy amplifiaction theorem
from [18], we briefly address the generalization of the
classical Re´nyi entropy Hα(X) of order α of a random
variable X to the Re´nyi entropy Sα(ρ) of order α of a
density operator ρ. Otherwise, though, we are only using
the classical Re´nyi entropy of order ∞, commonly known
as the min-entropy H∞(X) = − logmaxx PX(x).
2.3. Privacy amplification
In this paper, we only use privacy amplification with one-
bit output. A class Hn of hashing functions from {0, 1}n to
{0, 1} is called two-universal if for any pair x, y ∈ {0, 1}n
with x = y
∣∣{f ∈ Hn : f(x) = f(y)}∣∣ ≤ |Hn|2 .
Several two-universal classes of hashing functions are such
that evaluating and picking a function uniformly and at
random in Hn can be done efficiently [3, 21].
Theorem 2.1 ([18]). Let X be distributed over {0, 1}n, and
let ρ be a random state of q qubits1. Let F be the random
variable corresponding to the random choice (with uniform
distribution and independent from X and ρ) of a member of
a two-universal class of hashing functions Hn. Then
δ([F (X)⊗ F⊗ρ], [UNIF]⊗ [F ⊗ ρ])
≤ 1
2
2−
1
2 (S2([{X}⊗ρ])−S0([ρ])−1)
≤ 1
2
2−
1
2 (H∞(X)−q−1). (1)
The first inequality is the original theorem and (1) follows by
observing that S2([{X} ⊗ ρ]) ≥ H2(X) ≥ H∞(X). In this
paper, we only use this weaker version of the theorem.
Note that if the rightmost term of (1) is negligible, i.e.
say smaller than 2−εn, then this situation is 2−εn-close
to the ideal situation where F (X) is perfectly uniform
and independent of ρ and F . In particular, the situations
F (X) = 0 and F (X) = 1 are statistically indistinguishable
given ρ and F [13].
1Remember that ρ can be correlated with X in an arbitrary way. In
particular, we can think of ρ as an attempt to store the n-bit string X in q
qubits.
The following lemma is a direct consequence of Theo-
rem 2.1. In Section 4, this lemma will be useful for proving
the binding condition of our commitment scheme. Recall
that for X ∈ {0, 1}n, Bδn(X) denotes the set of all n-
bit strings at Hamming distance at most δn from X and
Bδn := |Bδn(X)| is the number of such strings.
Lemma 2.2. Let X be distributed over {0, 1}n, let ρ be a
random state of q qubits and let Xˆ be a guess for X given ρ.
Then, for all δ < 12 it holds that
Pr
[
Xˆ ∈ Bδn(X)] ≤ 2− 12 (H∞(X)−q−1)+log(Bδn).
In other words, given a quantum memory of q qubits ar-
bitrarily correlated with a classical random variable X , the
probability to find Xˆ at Hamming distance at most δn from
X where nh(δ) < 12 (H∞(X)− q) is negligible.
Proof: Here is a strategy to try to bias F (X) when given Xˆ
and F ∈R Hn: Sample X ′ ∈R Bδn(Xˆ) and output F (X ′).
Note that, using psucc as a short hand for the probability
Pr
[
Xˆ ∈ Bδn(X)] to be bounded,
Pr
[
F (X ′) = F (X)
]
=
psucc
Bδn
+
(
1− psucc
Bδn
)
1
2
=
1
2
+
psucc
2 ·Bδn ,
where the first equality follows from the fact that if X ′ = X
then Pr [F (X) = F (X ′)] = 12 . This is because Hn is
two-universal. Since the probability of correctly guessing
a binary F (X) given F and ρ is always upper bounded by
1
2 + δ([F (X)⊗ F ⊗ ρ], [UNIF]⊗ [F ⊗ ρ]), in combination
with Theorem 2.1 the above results in
1
2
+
psucc
2 ·Bδn ≤
1
2
+
1
2
2−
1
2 (H∞(X)−q−1)
and the claim follows immediately. 
3. Rabin oblivious transfer
3.1. The definition
A protocol for Rabin Oblivious Transfer (ROT) between
sender Alice and receiver Bob allows for Alice to send a
bit b through an erasure channel to Bob. Each transmission
delivers b or an erasure with probability 12 . Intuitively, a
protocol for ROT is secure if
• sender Alice gets no information on whether b was
received or not, no matter what she does, and
• receiver Bob gets no information about b with probabil-
ity at least 12 , no matter what he does.
3
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In this paper, we are considering quantum protocols for ROT.
This means that while in- and outputs of the honest senders
are classical, described by random variables, the protocol
may contain quantum computation and quantum communi-
cation, and the view of a dishonest player is quantum, and is
thus described by a random state.
Any such (two-party) protocol is specified by a family
{(Sn,Rn)}n>0 of pairs of interactive quantum circuits (i.e.
interacting through a quantum channel). Each pair is indexed
by a security parameter n > 0, where Sn and Rn denote the
circuits for sender Alice and receiver Bob, respectively. In
order to simplify the notation, we often omit the index n,
leaving the dependency on it implicit.
For the formal definition of the security requirements of
a ROT protocol, let us fix the following notation. Let B
denote the binary random variable describing S’s input bit
b, and let A and B′ denote the binary random variables
describing R’s two output bits, where the meaning is that A
indicates whether the bit was received or not. Furthermore,
for a dishonest sender S˜ (respecively R˜) let ρS˜ (ρR˜) denote
the random state describing S˜’s (R˜’s) view of the protocol.
Note that for a fixed candidate protocol for ROT, and for
a fixed input distribution PB , depending on whether we
consider two honest S and R, a dishonest S˜ and an honest
R, or an honest S and a dishonest R˜, the corresponding joint
distribution PBAB′ , PρS˜AB′ respectively PBρR˜ is uniquely
determined.
Definition 3.1. A two-party (quantum) protocol (S,R) is a
(statistically) secure ROT if the following holds.
Correctness: For honest S and R
Pr [B = B′|A = 1] ≥ 1− negl(n) .
Privacy: For any S˜
δ([A⊗ ρS˜], [UNIF]⊗ [ρS˜]) ≤ negl(n) .
Obliviousness: For any R˜ there exists an event E with
P [E ] ≥ 12 − negl(n) such that
δ([B ⊗ ρR˜|E ], [B]⊗ [ρR˜|E ]) ≤ negl(n) .
If any of the above trace distances equals 0, then the
corresponding property is said to hold perfectly. If one of
the properties only holds with respect to a restricted class
S of S˜’s respectively R of R˜’s, then this property is said
to hold and the protocol is said to be secure against S
respectively R.
Privacy requires that the joint quantum state is essentially
the same as whenA is uniformly distributed and independent
of the senders’s view, and obliviousness requires that there
exists some event which occurs with probability at least 12
(the event that the receiver does not receive the bit) and
under which the joint quantum state is essentially the same
as when B is distributed (according to PB) independently of
the receiver’s view.
3.2. The protocol
We introduce a quantum protocol for ROT that will be
shown perfectly private (against any sender) and statistically
oblivious against any quantum memory-bounded receiver.
The protocol is very simple (see Figure 1): S picks x ∈R
{0, 1}n and sends to R n qubits in state either |x〉+ or |x〉×
each chosen with probability 12 . R then measures all received
qubits either in the rectilinear or in the diagonal basis. With
probability 12 , R picked the right basis and gets x, while any
R˜ that is forced to measure part of the state (due to a memory
bound) can only have full information on x in case the +-
basis was used or in case the ×-basis was used (but not in
both cases). Privacy amplification using any two-universal
class of hashing functions Hn allows to obtain a proper ROT.
(In order to avoid aborting, we specify that if a dishonest S˜
refuses to participate, or sends data in incorrect format, then
R samples its output bits a and b′ both at random in {0, 1}.)
QOT(b):
1. S picks x ∈R {0, 1}n, and r ∈R {+,×}.
2. S sends |ψ〉 := |x〉r in basis r to R.
3. R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} and measures all qubits of
|ψ〉 in basis r′. Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
4. S announces r, f ∈R Hn, and s := b⊕ f(x).
5. R outputs a := 1 and b′ := s ⊕ f(x′) if r′ = r and
else a := 0 and b′ := 0.
Figure 1. Protocol for Rabin QOT
As we shall see in Section 3.5, the security of the QOT pro-
tocol against receivers with bounded-size quantum memory
holds as long as the bound applies before Step 4 is reached.
An equivalent protocol is obtained by purifying the sender’s
actions. Although QOT is easy to implement, the purified
or EPR-based version depicted in Figure 2 is easier to prove
secure. A similar approach was taken in the Shor-Preskill
proof of security for the BB84 quantum key distribution
scheme [20].
Notice that while QOT requires no quantum memory
for honest players, quantum memory for S seems to be
required in EPR-QOT. The following Lemma shows the strict
equivalence between QOT and EPR-QOT.
Lemma 3.2. QOT is secure if and only if EPR-QOT is secure.
The proof follows easily after observing that S’s choices of r
and f , together with the measurements all commute with R’s
actions. Therefore, they can be performed right after Step 1
with no change for R’s view. Modifying EPR-QOT that way
results in QOT.
Lemma 3.3. EPR-QOT is perfectly private.
Proof: It is straightforward to verify that no information
about whether R has received the bit is leaked to any sender
4
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EPR-QOT(b):
1. S prepares n EPR pairs each in state |Ω〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉).
2. S sends one half of each pair to R and keeps the
other halves.
3. R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} and measures all received
qubits in basis r′. Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
4. S picks r ∈R {+,×}, and measures all kept qubits
in basis r. Let x ∈ {0, 1}n be the outcome. S
announces r, f ∈R Hn, and s := b⊕ f(x).
5. R outputs a := 1 and b′ := s ⊕ f(x′) if r′ = r and
else a := 0 and b′ := 0.
Figure 2. Protocol for EPR-based Rabin QOT
S˜, since R does not send anything, i.e. EPR-QOT is non-
interactive! 
3.3. Modeling dishonest receivers
We model dishonest receivers in EPR-QOT under the as-
sumption that the maximum size of their quantum storage
is bounded. These adversaries are only required to have
bounded quantum storage when they reach Step 4 in EPR-
QOT. Before that, the adversary can store and carry out
quantum computations involving any number of qubits.
Apart from the restriction on the size of the quantum memory
available to the adversary, no other assumption is made. In
particular, the adversary is not assumed to be computation-
ally bounded and the size of its classical memory is not
restricted.
Definition 3.4. The set Rγ denotes all possible quantum
dishonest receivers {R˜n}n>0 in QOT or EPR-QOT where for
each n > 0, R˜n has quantum memory of size at most γn
when Step 4 is reached.
In general, the adversary R˜ is allowed to perform any
quantum computation compressing the n qubits received
from S into a quantum register M of size at most γn when
Step 4 is reached. More precisely, the compression function
is implemented by some unitary transform C acting upon
the quantum state received and an ancilla of arbitrary size.
The compression is performed by a measurement that we
assume in the computational basis without loss of generality.
Before starting Step 4, the adversary first applies a unitary
transform C:
2−n/2
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉 ⊗ C|x〉|0〉
→ 2−n/2
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉 ⊗
∑
y
αx,y|ϕx,y〉M |y〉Y ,
where for all x,
∑
y |αx,y|2 = 1. Then, a measurement in
the computational basis is applied to register Y providing
classical outcome y. The result is a quantum state in register
M of size γn qubits. Ignoring the value of y to ease the
notation, the re-normalized state of the system is now in its
most general form when Step 4 is reached:
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
αx|x〉 ⊗ |ϕx〉M ,
where
∑
x |αx|2 = 1.
3.4. Uncertainty relation
We first prove a general uncertainty result and derive from
that a corollary that plays the crucial role in the security proof
of EPR-QOT. The uncertainty result concerns the situation
where the sender holds an arbitrary quantum register of n
qubits. He may measure them in either the +- or the ×-
basis. We are interested in the distribution of both these
measurement results, and we want to claim that they cannot
both be “very far from uniform”. One way to express this
is to say that a distribution is very non-uniform if one can
identify a subset of outcomes that has much higher probabil-
ity than for a uniform choice. Intuitively, the theorem below
says that such sets cannot be found for both of the sender’s
measurements.
Theorem 3.5. Let the density matrix ρA describe the state of
a n-qubit register A. Let Q+(·) and Q×(·) be the respective
distributions of the outcome when register A is measured in
the +-basis respectively the ×-basis. Then, for any two sets
L+ ⊂ {0, 1}n and L× ⊂ {0, 1}n it holds that
Q+(L+) + Q×(L×) ≤
(
1 +
√
2−n|L+||L×|
)2
.
Proof: We can purify registerA by adding a registerB, such
that the state of the composite system is pure. It can then
be written as |ψ〉AB = ∑x∈{0,1}n αx|x〉A|ϕx〉B for some
complex amplitudes αx and normalised state vectors |ϕx〉.
Clearly, Q+(x) = |αx|2. To give a more explicit form of
the distribution Q×, we apply the Hadamard transformation
to register A:
(H⊗n ⊗ B)|ψ〉 =
∑
z∈{0,1}n
|z〉 ⊗
∑
x∈{0,1}n
2−
n
2 (−1)x·zαx|ϕx〉
and obtain
Q×(z) =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈{0,1}n
2−
n
2 (−1)x·zαx|ϕx〉
∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
Let L+ denote the complement of L+ and p its probability
Q+(L
+
). We can now split the sum in Q×(z) in the
following way:
Q×(z) =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈{0,1}n
2−
n
2 (−1)x·zαx|ϕx〉
∣∣∣∣∣
2
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=∣∣∣∣∣√p
∑
x∈L+
2−
n
2 (−1)x·z αx√
p
|ϕx〉
+
∑
x∈L+
2−
n
2 (−1)x·zαx|ϕx〉
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣√p · ζz|υz〉+
∑
x∈L+
2−
n
2 (−1)x·zαx|ϕx〉
∣∣∣∣∣
2
where |υz〉 is defined as follows: For the normalised state
|υ〉 := ∑
x∈L+
αx√
p |x〉|ϕx〉, ζz|υz〉 is the z-component of the
state H⊗n|υ〉 = ∑z ζz|z〉 ⊗ |υz〉. It therefore holds that∑
z |ζz|2 = 1.
To upperbound the amplitudes provided by the sum over
L+, we notice that the amplitude is maximized when all
unit vectors |ϕx〉 point in the same direction and when
(−1)x·zαx = |αx|. More formally,∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈L+
2−
n
2 (−1)x·zαx|ϕx〉
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2−n2
∑
x∈L+
|αx|
≤ 2−n2
√∣∣L+∣∣√ ∑
x∈L+
|αx|2 (2)
≤ 2−n2
√∣∣L+∣∣,
where (2) is obtained from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Using + and × as shorthands for
∣∣L+∣∣ respectively ∣∣L×∣∣,
we conclude that
Q×(L×) =
∑
z∈L×
Q×(z)
≤
∑
z∈L×
(
|√p · ζz|υz〉|+ 2−n2
√
+
)2
≤ p
∑
z∈L×
|ζz|2 + 2 · 2−n2
√
+
∑
z∈L×
|ζz|+ × · 2−n+
≤ p + 2 · 2−n2
√
+
√
×
∑
z∈L×
|ζz|2 + 2−n+× (3)
≤ p + 2
√
2−n+× + 2−n+×
= 1−Q+(L+) + 2
√
2−n+× + 2−n+×. (4)
Inequality (3) follows again from Cauchy-Schwarz while in
(4), we use the definition of p. The claim of the proposition
follows after re-arranging the terms. 
This theorem yields a meaningful bound as long as |L+| ·
|L×| < (√2− 1)2 · 2n, e.g. if L+ and L× both contain less
than 2n/2 elements. If for r ∈ {+,×}, Lr contains only the
n-bit string with the maximal probability of Qr, we obtain
as a corollary a slightly weaker version of a known relation
(see (9) in [15]).
Corollary 3.6. Let q+∞ and q×∞ be the maximal probabilities
of the distributions Q+ and Q× from above. It then holds
that q+∞ · q×∞ ≤ 14 (1 + c)4 where c = 2−n/2.
Theorem 3.5 can be generalised to more than two mutually
unbiased bases. We call different sets B0,B1, . . . ,BN of
bases of the complex Hilbert space C2n mutually unbiased,
if for all i = j ∈ {0, . . . , N}, it holds that
∀|ϕ〉 ∈ Bi ∀|ψ〉 ∈ Bj : |〈ϕ|ψ〉|2 = 2−n.
The proof of the following generalisation of Theorem 3.5 can
be found in [6].
Theorem 3.7. Let the density matrix ρA describe the state
of a n-qubit register A and let B0,B1, . . . ,BN be mutually
unbiased bases of register A. Let Q0(·), Q1(·), . . . , QN (·)
be the distributions of the outcome when register A is
measured in bases B0,B1, . . . ,BN , respectively. Then, for
any sets L0, L1, . . . , LN ⊂ {0, 1}n, it holds that
N∑
i=0
Qi(Li)
≤ 1−
(
N + 1
2
)
+
∑
0≤j<k≤N
(
1 +
√
2−n|Lj ||Lk|
)2
.
In particular, for ε > 0 and 0 < N < 2( 14−ε)n, writing Hi∞
for the min-entropy of the distribution Qi,
N∑
i=0
Hi∞ ≥ (N + 1)
(
log(N + 1)− negl(n)) .
3.5. Security against dishonest receivers
In this section, we show that EPR-QOT is secure against
any dishonest receiver having access to a quantum storage
device of size strictly smaller than half the number of qubits
received at Step 2.
In our setting, we use Theorem 3.5 to lowerbound the
overall probability of strings with small probabilities in the
following sense. For 0 ≤ γ + κ ≤ 1, define
S+ :=
{
x ∈ {0, 1}n : Q+(x) ≤ 2−(γ+κ)n} and
S× :=
{
z ∈ {0, 1}n : Q×(z) ≤ 2−(γ+κ)n}
to be the sets of strings with small probabilities and denote
by L+ := S+ and L× := S× their complements. (Here’s the
mnemonic: S for the strings with Small probabilities, L for
Large.) Note that for all x ∈ L+, we have that Q+(x) >
2−(γ+κ)n and therefore |L+| < 2(γ+κ)n. Analogously, we
have |L×| < 2(γ+κ)n. For the ease of notation, we abbre-
viate the probabilities that strings with small probabilities
occur as follows: q+ := Q+(S+) and q× := Q×(S×). The
next corollary now immediately follows from Theorem 3.5.
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Corollary 3.8. Let γ + κ < 12 . For the probability distribu-
tions Q+, Q× and the sets S+, S× defined above, we have
q+ + q× := Q+(S+) + Q×(S×) ≥ 1− negl(n).
Theorem 3.9. For all γ < 12 , QOT is secure against Rγ .
Proof: After Lemmata 3.2 and 3.3, it remains to show that
EPR-QOT is oblivious against Rγ . Since γ < 12 , we can find
κ > 0 with γ + κ < 12 . Consider a dishonest receiver in
EPR-QOT R˜ with quantum memory of size γn.
Using the notation from Section 3.1, we show that there
exists an event E such that P [E ] ≥ 12 − negl(n) as well
as δ([B ⊗ ρR˜|E ], [B] ⊗ [ρR˜|E ]) ≤ negl(n), as required
by the obliviousness condition of Definition 3.1. Let X
denote the random variable describing the outcome x of
S’s measurement (in basis r) in Step 4 of EPR-QOT. We
implicitely understand the distribution of X to be condi-
tioned on the classical outcome y of the measurement R˜
performs, as described in Section 3.3. We define E to be
the event X ∈ Sr. Note that E is independent of B and thus
[B|E ] = [B]. Furthermore, due to the uniform choice of r,
and using Corollary 3.8, P [E ] = 12 (q++q×) ≥ 12−negl(n).
In order to show the second condition, we have to show
that whenever E occurs, the dishonest receiver cannot dis-
tinguish the situation where B = 0 is sent from the one
where B = 1 is sent. As the bit B is masked by the output
of the hash function F (X) in Step 4 of EPR-QOT (where
the random variable F represents the random choice for f ),
this is equivalent to distinguish between F (X) = 0 and
F (X) = 1. This situation is exactly suited for applying
Theorem 2.1, which says that F (X) = 0 is indistinguishable
from F (X) = 1 whenever the right-hand side of (1) is
negligible.
In the case r = +, we have
H∞(X|X ∈ S+) = − log(max
x∈S+
Q+(x)
q+
)
≥ − log(2
−(γ+κ)n
q+
) = γn + κn + log(q+). (5)
If q+ ≥ 2−κ2 n then H∞(X|X ∈ S+) ≥ γn + κ2n and
indeed the right-hand side of (1) decreases exponentially
when conditioning on X ∈ S+. The corresponding holds
for the case r = ×.
Finally, if q+ < 2−κ2 n (or similarly q× < 2−κ2 n) then
instead of as above we define E as the empty event if r = +
and as the event X ∈ S× if r = ×. It follows that
P [E ] = 12 · q× ≥ 12 − negl(n) as well as H∞(X|E) =
H∞(X|X ∈ S×) ≥ γn + κn + log(q×) ≥ γn + κ2n
(for n large enough), both by Corollary 3.8 and the bound
on q+. 
3.6. Weakening the assumptions
Observe that QOT requires error-free quantum communica-
tion, in that a transmitted bit b, that is encoded by the sender
and measured by the receiver using the same basis, is always
received as b. And it requires a perfect quantum source
which on request produces one qubit in the right state, e.g.
one photon with the right polarization. Indeed, in case of
noisy quantum communication, an honest receiver in QOT
is likely to receive an incorrect bit, and the obliviousness of
QOT is vulnerable to imperfect sources that once in while
transmit more than one qubit in the same state: a malicious
receiver R˜ can easily determine the basis r ∈ {+,×}
and measure all the following qubits in the right basis.
However, current technology only allows to approximate the
behavior of single-photon sources and of noise-free quantum
communication. It would be preferable to find a variant of
QOT that allows to weaken the technological requirements
put upon the honest participants.
In this section, we present such a protocol based on BB84
states [1], BB84-QOT (see Figure 3). The security proof
follows essentially by adapting the security analysis of QOT
in a rather straightforward way, as will be discussed later.
Let us consider a quantum channel with an error probabil-
ity φ < 12 , i.e., φ denotes the probability that a transmitted bit
b, that is encoded by the sender and measured by the receiver
using the same basis, is received as 1−b. In order not to have
the security rely on any level of noise, we assume the error
probability to be zero when considering a dishonest receiver.
Also, let us consider a quantum source which produces two
or more qubits (in the same state), rather than just one, with
probability η < 1−φ. We call this the (φ, η)-weak quantum
model.
In order to deal with noisy quantum communication, we
need to do error-correction without giving the adversary
too much information. For this, we use secure sketches,
as introduced in [10]. A (,m, φ)-secure sketch2 is a
randomized function S : {0, 1} → {0, 1}∗ such that (1)
for any w ∈ {0, 1} and for w′ received from w by flipping
each bit (independently) with probability φ, the string w
can be recovered from w′ and S(w) except with negligible
probability (in ), and (2) for all random variables W over
{0, 1}, the “average min-entropy” of W given S(W ) is at
leastH∞(W )−m. We would like to point out that the notion
of average min-entropy used in [10] and here differs slightly
from the standard notion H∞(W |S(W )), but it implies that
for any ∆ > 0, the probability that S(W ) takes on a value
y such that H∞(W |S(W ) = y) ≥ H∞(W ) −m −∆ is at
least 1− 2−∆ (which is sufficient for our purpose).
Consider the protocol BB84-QOT in the (φ, η)-weak quan-
tum model shown in Figure 3. For simplicity, we assume n
to be even. The protocol uses a (n2 , α
n
2 , φ)-secure sketch S.
α can be chosen arbitrarily close to (but greater than) h(φ).
Like before, the memory bound in BB84-QOT applies before
Step 4.
By the properties of a secure sketch, it is obvious that R
receives the correct bit b if r′ = r, except with negligible
2Note that our definition of a secure sketch differs slightly from the one
given in [10].
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BB84-QOT(b):
1. S picks x ∈R {0, 1}n and a random index set
I+ ⊂R {1, . . . , n} of size n2 and sets I× : ={1, . . . , n} \ I+.
2. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n: If i ∈ I+, S sends |xi〉+ to R.
If otherwise i ∈ I×, S sends |xi〉×.
3. R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} and measures all qubits in
basis r′. Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
4. S picks r ∈R {+,×} and announces r, Ir, y : =
S(x|Ir ), f ∈R Hn/2, and s := b⊕ f(x|Ir ).
5. R can recover x|Ir from x′|Ir and y, and outputs
a := 1 and b′ := s ⊕ f(x|Ir ) if r′ = r and else
a := 0 and b′ := 0.
Figure 3. Protocol for the BB84 version of Rabin QOT
probability. Also, since there is no communication from R to
S, BB84-QOT is clearly private. Similar as for protocol QOT,
in order to argue about obliviousness we compare BB84-QOT
with a purified version. The proof of the following theorem
can be found in [6].
Theorem 3.10. In the (φ, η)-weak quantum model, BB84-
QOT is secure against Rγ for any γ < 1−η4 − h(φ)2 (if
parameter α is appropriately chosen).
4. Quantum commitment scheme
In this section, we present a BC scheme from a committer C
with bounded quantum memory to an unbounded receiver V.
The scheme is peculiar since in order to commit to a bit, the
committer does not send anything. During the committing
stage information only goes from V to C. The security
analysis of the scheme uses similar techniques as the analysis
of EPR-QOT.
4.1. The protocol
The objective of this section is to present a bounded
quantum-memory BC scheme COMM (see Figure 4).
Intuitively, a commitment to a bit b is made by measuring
random BB84-states in basis {+,×}[b].
As for the OT-protocol of Section 3.2, we present an
equivalent EPR-version of the protocol that is easier to
analyze (see Figure 5).
Lemma 4.1. COMM is equivalent to EPR-COMM.
Proof: The proof uses similar reasoning as the one for
Lemma 3.2. First, it clearly makes no difference, if we
change Step 5 to the following:
5’. V chooses the subset I , measures all qubits with index
in I in basis {+,×}[b] and all qubits not in I in basis
{+,×}[1−b]. V verifies that xi = x′i for all i ∈ I and
accepts if and only if this is the case.
COMM(b):
1. V picks x ∈R {0, 1}n and r ∈R {+,×}n.
2. V sends xi in the corresponding bases
|x1〉r1 , |x2〉r2 , . . . , |xn〉rn to C.
3. C commits to the bit b by measuring all qubits in
basis {+,×}[b]. Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
4. To open the commitment, C sends b and x′ to V.
5. V verifies that xi = x′i for those i where ri =
{+,×}[b]. V accepts if and only if this is the case.
Figure 4. Protocol for quantum commitment
EPR-COMM(b):
1. V prepares n EPR pairs each in state |Ω〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉).
2. V sends one half of each pair to C and keeps the
other halves.
3. C commits to the bit b by measuring all received
qubits in basis {+,×}[b]. Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the
result.
4. To open the commitment, C sends b and x′ to V.
5. V measures all his qubits in basis {+,×}[b] and
obtains x ∈ {0, 1}n. He chooses a random subset
I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size n2 . V verifies that xi = x′i
for all i ∈ I and accepts if and only if this is the
case.
Figure 5. Protocol for EPR-based quantum commitment
Finally, we can observe that the view of C does not change
if V would have done his choice of I and his measurement
already in Step 1. Doing the measurements at this point
means that the qubits to be sent to C collapse to a state
that is distributed identically to the state prepared in the
original scheme. The EPR-version is therefore equivalent to
the original commitment scheme from C’s point of view. 
It is clear that EPR-COMM is hiding, i.e., that the commit
phase reveals no information on the committed bit, since no
information is transmitted to V at all. Hence we have
Lemma 4.2. EPR-COMM is perfectly hiding.
4.2. Modeling dishonest committers
A dishonest committer C˜ with bounded memory of at most
γn qubits in EPR-COMM can be modeled very similarly to
the dishonest OT-receiver R˜ from Section 3.3: C˜ consists
first of a circuit acting on all n qubits received, then of a
measurement of all but at most γn qubits, and finally of
a circuit that takes the following input: a bit b that C˜ will
attempt to open, the γn qubits in memory, and some ancilla
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in a fixed state. The output is a string x′ ∈ {0, 1}n to be sent
to V at the opening stage.
Definition 4.3. We define Cγ to be the class of all commit-
ters {C˜n}n>0 in EPR-COMM that, at the start of the opening
phase (i.e. at Step 4), have a quantum memory of size at
most γn qubits.
We adopt the binding condition for quantum BC from [11]:
Definition 4.4. A (quantum) BC scheme is (statistically)
binding against C if for all {C˜n}n>0 ∈ C, the probability
pb(n) that C˜n opens b ∈ {0, 1} with success satisfies
p0(n) + p1(n) ≤ 1 + negl(n).
In the next section, we show that EPR-COMM is binding
against Cγ for any γ < 12 .
Note that the binding condition given here in Defini-
tion 4.4 is weaker than the classical one, where one would
require that a bit b exists such that pb(n) is negligible. But
it is the best that can be achieved for a general quantum
adversary who can always commit to 0 and 1 in superposi-
tion. However, an adversary with bounded quantum storage
cannot necessarily maintain a commitment in superposition
since the memory compression may force a collapse. Indeed,
in upcoming work, we show that commitment schemes exist
satisfying the stronger binding condition in the bounded
quantum-storage model [7]. While the weaker condition is
sufficient for many applications, the stronger one seems to
be necessary in some cases (see the conclusion).
4.3. Security proof of the commitment scheme
Note that the first three steps of EPR-QOT and EPR-COMM
(i.e. before the memory bound applies) are exactly the same!
This allows us to reuse Corollary 3.8 and the analysis of
Section 3.5 to prove the binding property of EPR-COMM.
Theorem 4.5. For any γ < 12 , COMM is perfectly hiding and
statistically binding against Cγ .
The proof is given below. It boils down to showing that
essentially p0(n) ≤ 1−q+ and p1(n) ≤ 1−q×. The binding
property then follows immediately from Corollary 3.8. The
intuition behind p0(n) ≤ 1 − q+ := 1 − Q+(S+) is that
a committer has only a fair chance in opening to 0 if x
measured in +-basis has a large probability, i.e., x ∈ S+.
The following proof makes this intuition precise by choosing
the ε and δ’s correctly.
Proof: It remains to show that EPR-COMM is binding
against Cγ . Let κ > 0 be such that γ + κ < 12 . For the
parameters κ and γ considered here, define Q+, S+ and q+
as well as Q×, S× and q× as in Section 3.5. Furthermore, let
0 < δ < 12 be such that h(δ) < κ/2, where h is the binary
entropy function, and choose ε > 0 small enough such that
h(δ) < (κ − ε)/2. This guarantees that Bδn ≤ 2(κ−ε)n/2
for all (sufficiently large) n. For every n we distinguish
between the following two cases. If q+ ≥ 2−εn/2 then
H∞(X|X ∈ S+) ≥ γn+κn+ log(q+) ≥ γn+
(
κ− ε
2
)
n
where the first inequality is argued as in (5). Applying
Lemma 2.2, it follows that any guess Xˆ for X satisfies
Pr
[
Xˆ ∈ Bδn(X) |X ∈ S+]
≤ 2− 12 (H∞(X|X∈S+)−γn−1)+log(Bδn)
≤ 2− ε4n+ 12 .
However, if Xˆ ∈ Bδn(X) then sampling half the positions
will detect an error except with probability not bigger than
2−δn. Hence,
p0(n) = (1− q+) · p0|X ∈S+ + q+ · p0|X∈S+
≤ 1− q+ + q+ · (2−δn(1− 2− ε4n+ 12 ) + 2− ε4n+ 12 ).
If on the other hand q+ < 2−εn/2 then trivially
p0(n) ≤ 1 = 1− q+ + q+ < 1− q+ + 2−εn/2.
In any case we have p0(n) ≤ 1− q+ + negl(n).
Analogously, we derive p1(n) ≤ 1 − q× + negl(n) and
conclude that
p0(n) + p1(n) ≤ 2− q+ − q× + negl(n)
≤ 1 + negl(n), (6)
where (6) is obtained from Corollary 3.8. 
4.4. Weakening the assumptions
As argued earlier, assuming that a party can produce single
qubits (with probability 1) is not reasonable given current
technology. Also the assumption that there is no noise on
the quantum channel is impractical. It can be shown that
a straightforward modification of COMM remains secure in
the (φ, η)-weak quantum model as introduced in Section 3.6,
with φ < 12 and η < 1− φ.
Let COMM’ be the modification of COMM where in Step 5
V accepts if and only if xi = x′i for all but about a φ-fraction
of the i where ri = {+,×}[b]. More precisely, for all but a
(φ + ε)-fraction, where ε > 0 is sufficiently small. The
following theorem is proven in [6].
Theorem 4.6. In the (φ, η)-weak quantum model, COMM’
is perfectly hiding and it is binding against Cγ for any γ
satisfying γ < 12 (1− η)− 2h(φ).
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5. Conclusion and further research
We have shown how to construct ROT and BC securely in
the bounded quantum-storage model. Our protocols require
no quantum memory for honest players and remain secure
provided the adversary has only access to quantum memory
of size bounded by a large fraction of all qubits transmitted.
Such a gap between the amount of storage required for
honest players and adversaries is not achievable by classical
means. All our protocols are non-interactive and can be
implemented using current technology.
In this paper, we only considered ROT of one bit per
invocation. Our technique can easily be extended to deal
with string ROT, essentially by using a class of two-universal
functions with range {0, 1}n rather than {0, 1}, for some 
with γ +  < 12 (respectively < 1−η4 − h(φ)2 for BB84-QOT).
Although other flavors of OTs can be constructed from
ROT using standard reductions, a more direct approach
would give a better ratio storage-bound/communication-
complexity. Recent extensions of this work have shown
that a 1-2 OT protocol built along the lines of BB84-
QOT is secure against adversaries with bounded quantum
memory [7]. Interestingly, the techniques used are quite
different from the ones of this paper (which appear to fail
in case of 1-2 OT), and they additionally allow to analyse
and prove secure the BC COMM with respect to the stronger
security definition, as discussed in Section 4.2.
The bit commitment scheme COMM can easily be trans-
formed into a string commitment scheme simply by com-
mitting bitwise, at the cost of a corresponding blow-up of
the communication complexity. In order to prove this string
commitment secure, though, it is necessary that COMM is
secure with respect to the stronger security definition.
How to construct and in particular prove secure a more
efficient string commitment scheme is still an open problem.
Furthermore, it is still unsolved how to construct and prove
secure a 1-m OT protocol, more efficient than via the general
reduction.
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